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Abstract
This paper studies financial intermediation (i.e., delegated moni-
toring) in a costly state verification model. There is a finite number of
agents, thus the intermediary cannot fully diversify its portfolio and is
subject to default risk. The role of the intermediary is to satisfy simul-
taneously the different portfolio preferences of borrowers and lenders.
Two questions arise when a delegated monitor is subject to non-trivial
default risk: (a) What arrangement solves the problem of monitoring
the monitor? (b) What intermediary portfolio accomplishes optimal
asset transformation between borrowers and lenders? Unlike previous
delegated monitoring studies, the law of large numbers is not sufficient
to obtain our results. Instead, we appeal to a stronger result, the large
deviation principle, which establishes that convergence in the law of
large numbers is exponential.
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1 Introduction
Financial intermediaries provide asset transformation services to agents that
are important in many ways. From a theoretical point of view, an economy
with financial intermediaries is presumed to be "better" than an economy
without intermediaries in the sense that the consumption allocations in the
former economy Pareto dominate those in the latter. More practically, inter-
mediation appears to have been "revealed preferred" to direct investment as
intermediaries account for a non-trivial fraction of GNP in most developed
economies (e.g., about 8 percent in the US). Tobin (1963, p. 186) argues that
according to the "new view" of monetary economics, the essential function of
financial intermediaries is to satisfy simultaneously the portfolio preferences
of both borrowers and lenders. He notes:
The reason that the intermediation of financial institutions. . . can
accomplish these [asset] transformations between the nature of the obli-
gations of the borrower and the nature of the asset of the ultimate lender
are these: (1) administrative economy and expertise in negotiating, ac-
counting, appraising, and collecting; (2) reduction of risk per dollar of
lending by the pooling of independent risks, with respect to both loan
default and to deposit withdrawal; (3) governmental guarantees of the
liabilities of the institutions and other provisions (bank examination,
investment regulations, supervision of insurance companies, last-resort
lending) designed to assure the solvency and liquidity of the institu-
tions. For these reasons, intermediation permits borrowers who wish to
expand their investments in real assets to be accommodated at lower
rates and easier terms than if they had to borrow directly from lenders.
In this paper we study the dominance of intermediated lending over di-
rect lending in a model that operationalizes the simultaneous or "two-sided"
(i.e., intermediary-borrower and intermediary-lender) nature of banking em-
phasized by Tobin and others. The intermediaries that we consider resem-
ble those of Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) in the sense that they
are "delegated monitors" where one agent monitors all investment projects. 1
^e use a costly state verification model (like Williamson) with default risk but no
However, our model differs fundamentally from this previous (limit economy)
literature because we consider an economy with a finite number of agents and
obtain our results for a delegated monitor with a finite sized portfolio. In
our model, the intermediary's default risk is not necessarily perfectly diversi-
fied away. The central questions which arise in such an economy are—"who
monitors the monitor?" and "what is the structure of optimal contracts that
solve the two-sided incentive problem inherent in this environment?"
These questions are not relevant in a limit economy because the proba-
bility of bank insolvency and the influence of a bank's portfolio choice on its
solvency disappears. More specifically, it is only in a finite (and in this case
more general) economy that both sides of the intermediation problem must
be considered. That is, in the finite case the optimal contract must be de-
signed to ensure simultaneously that entrepreneurs report truthfully to the
intermediary and that the intermediary reports truthfully to investors. In
contrast, in the limit the return on the intermediary's portfolio converges to
the mean of the distribution of returns from loans granted to entrepreneurs
(denoted by R in our paper). Thus, the intermediary can always guarantee
the investors a certain payoff and investors need never worry about moni-
toring the monitor in the limit. However, when the intermediary contracts
with only finitely many entrepreneurs, its portfolio is not perfectly diversi-
fied. In this case the intermediary's asset transformation problem involves
not only the choice of a rate of return on deposits (R), but also effectively in-
volves the non-trivial choice of a risky portfolio (i.e., a distribution of project
returns)—which implies directly a particular bankruptcy probability. Fur-
ther, this bankruptcy probability depends on both the bank's contracts with
entrepreneurs and its contracts with investors.
deposit withdrawal risk. Villamil (1991) shows that both types of risk can be accommo-
dated in a direct investment problem in a costly state verification model, but our main
concern is the monitor's two-sided incentive problem so we abstract from withdrawal risk.
In contrast, Diamond uses a model with non-pecuniary penalties.
We formally specify the model and agents' optimization problems in Sec-
tion 2. The paper contains two main results. Theorem 1 in Section 3.1
shows that two-sided simple debt contracts with delegated monitoring dom-
inate direct investment in an economy with non-trivial default risk. 2 Unlike
the law of large numbers argument used to obtain results in limit economies,
we use the large deviation principle to obtain our results. The large deviation
principle shows that convergence in the law of large numbers is exponential.
Strictly speaking, this technique is not essential for proving the dominance
of delegated monitoring over direct investment.3 However, in Section 3.2 we
show that the large deviation principle is uniquely useful in finite economies
because it gives us additional economic insight into the intermediary's asset
transformation problem: It allows us to characterize precisely (for a par-
ticular portfolio distribution) how "large" a finite sized intermediary must
be to achieve sufficient default risk diversification. This result shows that
the increasing returns to scale property that underlies delegated monitoring
models (i.e., contracting with an additional firm always lowers costs) need
not lead to counterfactual market size predictions—a single intermediary.
Theorem 2 in Section 4.1 shows that simple debt is the optimal con-
tract for both the intermediary-borrower and the intermediary-lender sides
of the contracting problem. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
The intermediary-lender side of the contract resembles the Gale and Hell-
wig (1985) and Williamson (1986) problem where simple debt is optimal
because it minimizes monitoring costs. However, standard arguments do
not apply to the intermediary-borrower side of the contract because the in-
2Simple debt contracts promise holders fixed rates of return when the issuer is solvent
and state contingent returns when insolvent. See Section 2.1 for a formal definition and
discussion.
3Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) use law of large numbers arguments to show
the optimality of delegated monitoring when costs are bounded. In Section 3.1 we show
that this approach breaks down (so a large deviation argument is essential) when moni-
toring costs are unbounded (i.e., depend on the size of the intermediary's portfolio).
termediary (unlike risk neutral investors) must consider the distribution of
payments it receives from entrepreneurs. The distribution of payments is im-
portant to the intermediary because it affects the delegated monitoring cost
borne by investors. Thus, both sides of the problem are interconnected and
the structure of the optimal intermediary-borrower contract is not obvious.
The main insight in Theorem 2 is that for a sufficiently large intermediary,
the marginal change in delegation costs (i.e., monitoring the monitor) is small
and is dominated by the marginal change in direct monitoring costs borne
by the intermediary. Hence, simple debt is optimal for the intermediary-
borrower side of the contract because minimizing the expected costs of mon-
itoring the entrepreneurs remains the main concern—despite the fact that
the intermediary must effectively choose both a face value for the debt and a
distribution. In Section 4.2 we discuss the relationship between Theorem 2
and banking history.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with finite numbers of two types of risk neutral agents,
investors and entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur i = 1, ... ,7 is endowed with
a risky investment project which transforms y units of a single input at time
into 6 t units of output at time 1, but has no endowment of the input. In
contrast, each investor j = 1, . .
.
, J is endowed with 1 unit of the homoge-
neous input, but has no direct access to a productive technology. We assume
that y is an integer with y > 1. Hence, the project of an entrepreneur cannot
be financed by a single investor. 4 The total available supply of investment
is larger than the input required by all entrepreneurs, so J investors can be
accommodated by the I entrepreneurs (i.e., J = yl). All entrepreneurs and
4This assumption implies that there is duplicative monitoring in the absence of inter-
mediation, because more than one investor must monitor a single entrepreneur. Delegated
monitoring economizes on these costs (cf., Diamond (1984)).
investors are symmetrically informed about the distribution of 9i at time 0,
but asymmetric information exists about the state of the project's actual re-
alization ex-post: Only entrepreneur i freely observes the realization of 0, at
time 1, where this realization is denoted by w. Let F(w) denote the known
distribution of a particular entrepreneur's project. Finally, suppose that a
technology exists which can be used to verify w to non-owners at time 1 with
the following characteristics:
(Tl) Use of the state verification technology is costly; and
(T2) w is privately revealed only to the individual who requests (deterministic)
costly state verification (CSV). 5
Assumption (Tl) is similar with the specification of the CSV technology
in Townsend (1979), except that as in Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 651) the
verification cost is comprised of both a pecuniary component and an indirect
"pecuniary equivalent" of a non-pecuniary cost. The non-pecuniary costs
permit negative utility but rule out negative consumption, while pecuniary
equivalents of non-pecuniary costs ensure that the costs can be shared by
the contracting parties. 6 In contrast, assumption (T2) differs fundamentally
from the specification in Townsend. In his model w is publicly announced
after CSV occurs, while in our model w is privately revealed only to the agent
who requests CSV. Assumption (T2) is essential for our analysis since if all
information could be made public ex-post, there would be no need to monitor
the monitor. However, it also appears to accurately describe the privacy and
institutional features which characterize most lending arrangements. 7
The following assumptions summarize technical aspects of the economy.
5Stochastic verification is discussed in the concluding section.
6These costs may be thought of as the money paid to an attorney to file a claim (a
pecuniary cost) and the monetary value of time lost when visiting the attorney (a pecuniary
equivalent). Note that Diamond's costs were unbounded while these costs are fixed.
7Diamond (1984, p. 395) observes: "Financial intermediaries in the world monitor
much information about their borrowers in enforcing loan covenants, but typically do not
directly announce this information or serve an auditor's function."
(Al) The 6i are independent, identically distributed random variables on the
probability space (ft, .4, P). 8
(A2) The distribution F has a continuously differentiate density / with re-
spect to the Lebesgue measure, and f(x) > for every x G [0, T].
(A3) The ex-post verification cost is a fixed constant.
Entrepreneurs have technologies but no input and investors have input
but no technologies. Thus, agents must trade to facilitate production. In
the remainder of this section we specify contracts which govern trade among
agents and the optimization problems from which these contracts can be
derived. Formal proofs that the contracts are indeed optimal are deferred to
Sections 3 and 4.
2.1 The Direct Investment Problem
Let all direct, bilateral interactions between investors and entrepreneurs be
regulated by a contract whose general form is defined as follows.
Definition 1. A one-sided contract between an investor and an entrepreneur
is a pair (.#(•), 5), where R(-) is an integrable, positive payment function on
jR+, such that R(w) < w for every w G 1R+ and S is an open subset of 2R+
which determines the states where monitoring occurs.
As is standard practice in this literature, we restrict the universe of con-
tracts that we consider to the set of incentive compatible contracts. Let
C = (R(.),S) denote this set. The following condition ensures that all con-
tracts under consideration satisfy this restriction: There exists R G M+ such
that S = {w: R(w) < R}. It is well known that the imposition of this re-
striction is without loss of generality because any arbitrary contract can be
replaced by an incentive compatible contract with the same actual payoff
8We will always refer to this probability space without mentioning it explicitly, when
writing P for probability or E for expected value.
(cf., Townsend (1988, p. 416)). Therefore, the set of all incentive compati-
ble contracts is fully specified by the tuple (R(-),R). We study a particular
type of contract, called a simple debt contract (SDC), which Gale and Hell-
wig (1985) and Williamson (1986) have shown is the optimal contract among
all one-sided investment schemes. We state this result formally in Section 3
as Theorem GHW. This contract is defined as follows:
Definition 2. (R(-),R) is a simple debt contract if: R(w) = w for w E S =
{w < R] and R(w) = R if w G Sc = {w > R}.
The payment schedules in Definition 2 resemble simple debt because:
(i) When verification does not occur the payment to the investor is constant
(i.e., the entrepreneur pays a fixed amount R for all realizations of the
state above some cutoff level), where Sc is the complement of S.
(ii) When verification does occur the payment to the investor is state con-
tingent (i.e., the entrepreneur pays the entire realization for all outcomes
below the cutoff), where S is viewed as the set of bankruptcy states.
We will often denote SDCs by R. These contracts arise as optimal (cost-
minimizing) responses to asymmetric information problems in economies
with costly deterministic state verification technologies. Agents minimize
verification costs by verifying only low realizations of #, and accepting fixed
payments (which do not require monitoring) in all other states.
The investor and the entrepreneur's direct investment problem can now
be stated formally:
subject to
-f R{w)dF(w)- I cdF(w)>r. (1)
J Jo Js
This "one-sided problem" describes the nature of trade when investors
and entrepreneurs contract directly: The expected utility of a representative
8
entrepreneur is maximized, subject to a constraint that the expected return
of a representative investor, net of monitoring costs (c), be at least as great as
some reservation level (r). Note that R(-) is the total payment to all investors,
and 11J is the number of investors required to fund a single project. The
problem reflects the assumption that credit markets are competitive.9
2.2 The Delegated Monitoring Problem
We now construct the intermediary's "two-sided problem." In the one-sided
problem, agents write direct bilateral contracts: each investor must moni-
tor each entrepreneur with whom he/she contracts in bankruptcy states so
duplicative monitoring is inherent. In contrast, if investors elect a monitor
to perform the verification task, the two-sided arrangement may eliminate
some of the duplicative monitoring even though investors must monitor the
monitor sometimes. We begin by considering the election of an intermedi-
ary: The lending market is competitive, hence it follows that an investor
who wishes to act as an intermediary must offer contracts which maximize
the expected utility of the entrepreneurs and assure each investor of at least
the reservation level of utility. Otherwise, agents would trade directly or an-
other intermediary would offer an alternative contract (i.e., there is free entry
into intermediation) with terms that are preferable to the / entrepreneurs
and/or the remaining J — 1 investors. Let (R(-),S) denote the entrepreneur-
intermediary side of the contract and (/?*(•), S*) denote the intermediary-
investor side. 10 Thus, the intermediary's problem embodies optimization by
all agents in the economy.
9We consider an economy in which there are more agents who wish to invest than
investment opportunities. Since the supply of loans is inelastic, the level of return necessary
to attract investors is driven down to the reservation level r.
10 Recall that (R(.),S) is also used to denote the entrepreneur-investor contract in the
one-sided model. We avoid introducing additional notation at this point because the
incentive problem associated with ensuring that entrepreneurs report truthfully is the
same regardless of whether they report to the investors directly or to the intermediary.
We next derive the random variables which describe the income from the
intermediary's portfolio. Recall that R(w ) denotes the payoff by an entrepre-
neur to the intermediary if output w is realized and 0, is the random variable
which describes the output w of a particular entrepreneur i in state u. Con-
sequently, the intermediary's income from this entrepreneur, given transfer
R{-), is Gi(R(');u>) = R(9i(uj)). The random variables G t are independent
for each choice of /?(•) because the #, are independent. Assume that the
intermediary contracts with i = 1,2,...,/ entrepreneurs. Then the average
income of the intermediary per entrepreneur under payment schedule /?(•),
denoted by G / (i?(-);^), is:
G I {R(-)-u) =
-Y.G t {R(-)-^). (2)
1 !=i
Denote the distribution function of G ! (-) by F ! (-).
We now specify the intermediary's cost structure for monitoring the en-
trepreneurs and the investors' cost structure for monitoring the monitor (in-
termediary). Let c denote the actual fixed cost incurred by the intermediary
when it monitors entrepreneur i, and c] denote the actual cost incurred by
an investor when he/she monitors the intermediary with portfolio of size /.
The expected monitoring costs are of primary importance to the intermediary
and the investors when they make their decisions at time (i.e., Js cdF(-)
and /5 . d] dF! (-) respectively). These expected costs depend on three factors:
the actual costs (c and c}), the relevant states (5 and 5*), and (in general)
on the size of the intermediary (via c\ and i?/ (-)). We impose the following
upper boundary on the investors' costs of monitoring the monitor:
(CS) The costs, cj, do not increase exponentially in /.
Both bounded and most unbounded cost structures satisfy this assump-
tion, hence it is not restrictive. 11 Boundedness implies that the marginal
11 Exponentially increasing costs are permissible if they do not increase faster than a
bound given by equation (21) in the Appendix, but we regard them as implausible.
10
cost of the intermediary from contracting with additional firms is decreasing
in /, giving it an inherent cost advantage relative to individual investors:
The total monitoring costs per depositor are fs cdF(-) + fs* c *i dF(-). If d\ is
fixed (or bounded), then adding an additional firm does not increase costs.
However, it decreases the probability of default by the intermediary. This
latter effect can be interpreted as the source of the intermediary's cost ad-
vantage in models where costs are bounded from above. Of course, such cost
advantages may exist (as Tobin suggests in (1) in the Introduction), but we
view unbounded costs as an interesting benchmark case. One unbounded
cost example that satisfies assumption CS is c\ = c/, where state verification
by investors involves verifying the full state (i.e., each of the / projects in
the intermediary's portfolio). The institutional structure in this example is
such that intermediary failures are quite costly. However, if investors can
economize further on these costs (e.g., by monitoring only insolvent firms),
then delegated monitoring will be even more attractive.
The two-sided contract between the intermediary and each entrepreneur,
and the intermediary and the investors, can now be defined.
Definition 3. A two-sided contract is a four-tuple ((./?(•), 5), (/?*(•), 5*))
having the following properties:
(i) R(-) is an integrable positive payment function from an entrepreneur to
the intermediary such that R(w) < w for every w £ iR+, and S is an
open subset of M+ which determines the set of all realizations of an
entrepreneur's project where the intermediary must monitor;
(ii) R*(-) is an integrable positive payment function from the intermediary to
the investors such that R*(w) < w. For every realization w of G 7 (-), 12
the payment to an individual investor is given by -~R*(w); 13 and S* is
12 Recall that G (•) is the average income per entrepreneur defined by equation (2).
13 /?*() is the total payment by the intermediary to investors per entrepreneur. To derive
the payment to an individual investor, multiply this amount with yz\-
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an open subset of M+ which determines the set of all realizations of the
intermediary's income from the entrepreneurs the investors must monitor.
We now derive the set of all incentive compatible two-sided contracts. As
before, we restrict our analysis to this set without loss of generality. Each en-
trepreneur will announce an output which minimizes its payment obligations
to the intermediary. Let w = argminxeS R(x) be the output that minimizes
this payoff over all non-monitoring states, and recall that w is observed di-
rectly in the monitoring states S. Consequently, the announcement by an
entrepreneur is given by arg minx€ r^ ^ R(x). A similar condition holds for
the intermediary-investor portion of the contract (i.e., R*(-),R*). As in the
one-sided problem, the following condition ensures that all contracts are in-
centive compatible. There exist R, R* 6 M+ such that 5 = {w: R(w) < R}
and S* = {w:R*(w) < R*}. The set of all incentive compatible two-sided
contracts is fully specified by the four-tuple (R(-),R), (R*(-),R*).
Finally, a two-sided simple debt contract can now be defined:
Definition 4. A contract (R(-),R), (R*(>),R*) is a two-sided simple debt
contract (denoted by (R,R*)) if:
(i) R(w) = wior we S = {w < R} and R(w) = R if w <E Sc = {w > R};
(ii) R*{w) = w for w 6 S* = {w < R*} and R*(w) = R* if w
€
S* c = {w >
RT}.
We will often denote two-sided simple debt contracts by (R,R*).
The intermediary's two-sided optimization problem can now be stated:
max \w — R(w)] dF(w)
(R(-),R),(R'(),R')Jo
subject to
— / R'MdF'iRi-)^)^) - f cidF'iR^RXw) > r (3)
-wo Js*J
j [w - R'iw^dF^Ri-^R^w) - f cdF(w)
Jo Js
> r. (4)
12
This problem states that the intermediary maximizes the expected utility
of each ex-ante identical entrepreneur subject to two constraints. (3) states
that the expected payoff to the J — 1 remaining investors (i.e., those who
did not become intermediaries) must be at least r, the reservation level of
utility. (4) states that the profit from intermediation (i.e., net payoffs from
the entrepreneurs less the payoff to the investors) must also be at least r.
3 Delegated Monitoring
In this section we first review the direct investment problem (Theorem GHW)
solved by Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Williamson (1986). In Section 3.1, the
first result of our paper (Theorem 1) establishes that two-sided simple debt
with delegated monitoring dominates one-sided direct investment if there are
sufficiently many entrepreneurs. 14 The key problem is that our finite dele-
gated monitor is not completely diversified (i.e., cannot guarantee investors
a riskless payoff). Further, the (constant but default risky) payoff offered by
the intermediary depends in a non-trivial way on its investment contracts
with entrepreneurs. Thus, the bank not only chooses a payoff R*
,
but also
(implicitly) chooses a distribution dF 1 by choosing R. Because the costs of
monitoring the monitor may depend on the size of the bank's portfolio, the
proof of Theorem 1 relies on the large deviation principle. This principle,
and its relation to the law of large numbers, is discussed. In the proof, we
refer to certain mathematical results proved in the Appendix. In Section 3.2
we compute (for two particular portfolio distributions) how "large" a finite
sized intermediary must be to achieve sufficient default risk diversification.
Theorem GHW. Simple Debt is the optimal contract among all one-sided
investment schemes.
MWe prove the optimality of two-sided simple debt contracts in Section 4.
13
The strategy of the proof is as follows: 15 Consider two optimal contracts:
Let ^bea simple debt contract and (A(-), A) be some alternative contract.
Since both contracts are optimal, both must yield the same expected payoff
to entrepreneurs. With the first contract investors request verification if
w < R. In the alternative contract, verification occurs in all states w such
that w < A. Since A > R (otherwise the contracts cannot have the same
return to entrepreneurs) the expected verification costs must be less for the
simple debt contract R. We will refer to this result in the proof of Theorem 1.
3.1 Optimality of Intermediation
We now prove that intermediation is optimal.
Theorem 1. Two-sided simple debt contracts with delegated monitoring
strictly dominate one-sided direct investment if there are sufficiently many
entrepreneurs.
Proof. Our arguments depend on the continuity of the constraints, estab-
lished by Lemma 1 in the Appendix, and can be summarized as follows. Let
R be the simple debt contract which is optimal among all one-sided schemes
described by Theorem GHW. We show that there exists an R* such that (3)
is binding for the two-sided contract (R,R*), and that by increasing R* the
payoff to investors increases and (3) does not bind. 16 We next show that (4)
is fulfilled but not binding. Hence increasing R* slightly makes both con-
straints slack if the number of entrepreneurs is sufficiently large. This proves
the Theorem since by lowering R we can make the entrepreneurs better off
than in the one-sided scheme.
15See Gale and Hellwig (1985) or Williamson (1986) for a formal proof.
16
In general, the investors' payoff does not increase monotonically with R" because the
probability that investors must monitor the intermediary is an increasing function of Ft*
.
This is also true for one-sided schemes (cf., Gale and Hellwig (1985, p. 662)).
14
We begin by showing that the costs of monitoring the monitor go to zero
if R* is less than the intermediary's expected return from one entrepreneur,
R* < E[Gi(R(-))], and if the intermediary is sufficiently large. This means:
lim fcMF'Cw) = for every R* < E[Gi(R(-))]. (5)/—>oo J
(5) follows immediately from (21) of Lemma 4 in the Appendix, which es-
tablishes that the probability of a default by the delegated monitor (i.e., the
probability that an investor must monitor the monitor), converges to zero
exponentially. However, by assumption (CS) the monitoring costs c*{ do not
increase exponentially. The key insight of the proof is that, in expected
terms, the costs go to zero.
The Theorem is proved as follows:
(i) The law of large numbers implies that
lim f R
m{w)dF I {R{-)){w) = R* for every R* < E[Gi(R(-))]. (6)
(6) indicates that the probability of a default by the delegated monitor
goes to zero. Hence investors get the face value of the SDC with certainty.
(ii) (5) and (6) imply that we can find a two-sided contract (R,A*) such
that (3) is fulfilled for sufficiently large / but not binding. Because of
the continuity of (3) with respect to R and A* (Lemma 1), there must
exist a face value R* < A" such that (3) is binding for the two-sided
contract (R,R*). By construction, increasing R* slightly implies that the
investors' payoff increases.
(iii) All that remains to show is that (4) is also fulfilled, but not binding.
Because of (5), it follows that /5 cdF > fs . d\ dF 1 for all sufficiently large
/. This and the fact that (3) is binding implies
if R*(w)dF ! <{J -l)(r+ / cdF). (7)
Jo Js
Consequently,
/ [w- R'iwjjdF 1 - [cdF
Jo Js
15
> IE[Gi(R)] -jfcdF-{J- l)r >Jr-{J- l)r = r,
where the first inequality follows from (7) and the second inequality fol-
lows from the fact that R must fulfill constraint (1) of the one-sided
problem by assumption. This proves Theorem 1.
In the proof of Theorem 1 we use the large deviation principle. This
principle is related to the law of large numbers but is stronger as the large
deviation principle shows that convergence in the law of large numbers is
exponential (see Lemma 4 in the Appendix). The large deviation principle is
important in our analysis for two reasons. First, it is essential in establishing
(5) in the proof when monitoring costs depend on the size of the intermedi-
ary's portfolio. Second, regardless of the monitoring cost structure, it allows
us to characterize (for a particular distribution) how "large" a finite sized
intermediary must be to achieve sufficient default risk diversification. The
economic intuition behind the problem addressed by Theorem 1 is that mon-
itoring costs may increase in the number of entrepreneurs (i.e., as the size
of the intermediary gets large, the verification costs, c}, in the bankruptcy
state become large as well). However, if the probability of default goes to
zero "fast enough," then the expected value of the costs of monitoring the
monitor become insignificant for a well diversified intermediary - even though
the intermediary is of finite size and hence is not perfectly diversified. The
role of the large deviation principle is to provide a convergence result that is
"fast enough" (i.e., faster than that provided by the law of large numbers)
to generate gains from intermediation. In Section 3.2 we provide examples
which show that sufficient diversification is achieved by remarkably small
intermediaries.
Theorem 1 establishes that two-sided arrangements are better than one-
sided direct investment. However, the following problem remains: If (3)
and (4) are not binding it is not clear who gets the surplus. Thus, the
16
maximization problem is not well defined. The following Proposition shows
that this difficulty does not arise and that optimal contracts exist.
Proposition 1. // there are sufficiently many entrepreneurs, then there
exist optimal contracts among the set of all two-sided simple debt contracts.
The two constraints from the intermediary's optimization problem bind for
all optimal contracts.
Proof. The result follows directly from the continuity results of Lemma
1 in the Appendix. The existence of optimal contracts is straightforward
since according to Lemma 1 both the constraints and the argument we are
maximizing over are continuous functions of R and R*. To show that both
constraints must bind for optimal contracts, consider the following cases,
(i) Suppose by way of contradiction that at an optimum both constraints
do not bind. Then R can be reduced slightly without violating the con-
straints. This, however, contradicts the optimality of the contract, so it
is not possible that both constraints are slack at an optimum,
(ii) Suppose that only (3) does not bind. Then R* can be reduced slightly
without violating the constraint. This reduces the total payment of the
intermediary to the investors, but (4) no longer binds and the above
argument can be applied to get a contradiction,
(iii) Suppose that only (4) does not bind. We must show that (3) no longer
binds if R* is increased by a small amount. This is not straightforward
since by increasing R' we increase the expected cost of monitoring the
monitor. However, (6) establishes that this expected monitoring cost
goes to zero as the size of the intermediary increases. Further, it follows
from (4) that R* remains bounded away from EG l (R) as / increases. 17
Thus, the expected cost of monitoring the monitor remains close to zero
(i.e., changes very little) if we increase R* slightly. If only (4) does not
17 Divide both sides of (4) by / and take the limit for / — oo.
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bind the gain from a higher payment to investors exceeds the loss from
an increase in monitoring expenditures and (3) does not bind, a contra-
diction. Hence, both constraints must bind at an optimum.
3.2 Optimality of "Small" Intermediaries
In this Section we show by way of two simple (but not pathological) para-
metric examples that small intermediaries can support efficient investment
arrangements. That is, we compute the rate function given by the "large
deviation principle" from Lemma 4 in the Appendix for two alternative dis-
tributions of the intermediary's portfolio. Our results show that intermedi-
ation works surprisingly well—even for "small" intermediaries (those with
investment portfolios of only 30 ex-ante identical but independent firms).
Both examples have the following characteristics. From Lemma 4 in the
Appendix, the rate function T(x) is given by
T(a;) = supx£-log(M(£)),
where M(£) is the moment-generating function, and x is the face value of
the intermediary-investor part of the simple debt contract, i.e., R*. As-
sume that x = 0.3 and that the intermediary-firm part of the contract is
R = 1. We consider two different (discrete) firm project return distributions
under R (i.e., two different distributions of G
t
(R;w)), and hence two differ-
ent moment-generating functions, with a common expected value of 0.5. In
both examples the intermediary contracts with 30 entrepreneurs with inde-
pendent project returns. Following equations (20) and (21) in the Appendix,
the probability of a default by the delegated monitor is given by e'301^. The
cost of monitoring an entrepreneur is c = 0.3. We now compute (using the
intermediary's optimization problem from Section 2.2) bounds on the cost
of monitoring the monitor (c}) for which intermediation is optimal for two
18
different return distributions. 18
Example 1. Assume that each firm's discrete project return distribution is
as follows: There is a bad state where the return from investment is and
a good state where the output is 1, and both states are equally likely. The
moment generating function is given by
M«) = \ + \^.
Following Varadhan (1984, p. 9) the rate function I(x) is given by
-. . f log 2 + xlog x + (1 — x) log(l — x) for < x < 1;Z
\
x
) = 1 .
t oo otherwise.
Thus, T(0.3) = 0.0822. When there are 30 firms, the probability of default by
a bank using the two-sided simple debt contract R = 1, R* = 0.3 is 0.0847. 19
We compute monitoring cost boundaries for c and cj for which intermediation is
optimal when the intermediary has no initial endowment and two investors are needed
to finance one project. We omit the intermediary's endowment to simplify computations,
but note that all constraints will be less binding if it has an endowment. Constraint (3)
is:
- / R'(w)dFI (R(-),R)(w)- f c*I dF
I (R(),R)(w)>r-
* Jo Js*
where r =
^ f R(w)dF — fs cdF because each investor's reservation value is the return
available from direct investment. Let d) denote the probability of default by a bank of
size /, let d denote the probability of default by an entrepreneur, and let E{R()) denote
the expected return from an entrepreneur. Then (3) is fulfilled if
1/2(1 - d])R* - c)d) > \/2E{R{-)) - dc. (Fl)
(Fl) gives for every c a value of cj under which investors get their reservation utility.
Constraint (4) is:
f [w- R'iwfldF'iR^tRXw)- f cdF(w)>0.
Jo Js
By substituting (3) into (4), and using the above notation it follows that (4) is fulfilled if
c'jd'j < c. (F2)
All computations in Examples 1 and 2 are based on formulae Fl and F2.
19This is e _00822n
,
where n is the number of firms (cf., Lemma 4 and (20) and (21)).
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We now compute values for c and c\ for which intermediation dominates
direct investment for this small intermediary that contracts with 30 firms
when two investors are needed to finance one project (a worst case scenario
assumption). Recall that c = 0.3. Then as long as d\ < 1.4674c, investors
get their reservation utility (i.e., (3) is satisfied). Further, the intermediary's
profit is non-negative if c] < 11.8046c (i.e., (4) is satisfied). Note that the
costs of monitoring the monitor, c*j, are almost the same as the cost of mon-
itoring an entrepreneur, so the gains from delegated monitoring are not very
great for this distribution, given the assumed parametric specifications.
Example 2. Now assume that each firm's (less risky) discrete project return
distribution is as follows: The values and 1 occur with probability 1/4 each,
and the value 1/2 occurs with probability 1/2. Recall that the rate function
I(x) is given by
l(x) = supx£-log(M(0),
ten
where the moment-generating function in this case is
M(0 = 1/4 + jel + -U*.
Recall that R' = x = 0.3. Thus, 1(0.3) = 0.16457. 20 When there are 30
firms, the probability of default by a bank using the two-sided simple debt
contract in this parametric example is 0.007176. Recall that c = 0.3. As
long as c] < 57.5616c investors get their reservation utility. The intermedi-
ary's profit is non-negative if c] < 139.3478c. Thus, intermediation strongly
dominates direct investment in this example—even when bankruptcy by the
intermediary requires every investor to monitor all projects, i.e., c} = cl (the
case discussed in Section 2.2).
The first example can be viewed as a ''worst case scenario" in the sense
that this distribution is very risky since all the mass is in the tails. Never-
20The supremum is reached at £ = —1.6946.
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theless, with only 30 ex-ante identical firms the probability of insolvency is
only 0.0847. In other words, even if the delegated monitor invests in only
a relatively small number of firms (30), diversification (and hence delegated
monitoring) works well. In the second example where the distribution we
start with is less risky, intermediation works even better. With the same
number of firms the probability of default is only 0.0007176. These examples
show that our results hold not only for some arbitrarily large but finite case,
but for surprisingly small intermediaries.
The result that "small" intermediaries can support efficient intermedia-
tion arrangements is of particular economic interest in a delegated monitor-
ing context. Inherent in delegated monitoring models of intermediation is an
increasing returns to scale phenomenon: When the intermediary contracts
with an additional firm, expected monitoring costs are always lowered. This
fact has led some to argue that the market structure implied by delegated
monitoring theories is counterfactual, i.e., a monopoly market structure. In
fact, these examples suggest that this critique has little real content. If di-
versification works very fast (i.e., goes to the mean exponentially), then the
addition of additional firms becomes negligible very quickly as well. Conse-
quently, many "small" but finite intermediaries are likely to attain sufficient
risk diversification simultaneously. 21
21 Strictly speaking, it is possible to partition an infinite set of entrepreneurs into an
infinite number of subsets, where each infinite subset of entrepreneurs contracts with a
particular delegated monitor to obtain a model with multiple intermediaries. However, the
"sufficient diversification of small portfolios" argument seems more intuitively plausible
(to us) as a means of obtaining multiple intermediaries than arguments which depend
on partitions of an infinite set of entrepreneurs (and the consequent absence of default
risk). The multiple intermediaries that emerge in our model are single agents, rather than
multiple agents who form an intermediary coalition as in Boyd and Prescott (1986).
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4 Optimality of Two-Sided Simple Debt
In this Section we prove that two-sided simple debt contracts solve the two-
sided monitoring problem inherent in an economy with non-trivial default
risk. Section 4.1 contains the result (Theorem 2), and Section 4.2 contains
a discussion of its economic implications. We begin by stating a Corollary
that is essential for establishing the Theorem, and provide an example that
illustrates the main economic problem addressed by the proof. The proof that
two-sided simple debt is optimal requires a stronger result than Lemma 4 (in
the Appendix) used in the proof of Theorem 1. That is, in Theorem 1 we used
Lemma 4 to show that the probabilities of default converged exponentially
to zero. In Theorem 2 we use Lemma 5 (in the Appendix) to show that
the densities also converge exponentially to zero. From this result we get
the following Corollary which establishes that the difference in probability
between the realization being below X\ and x 2 , respectively, is bounded by
the absolute value of the difference between x± and x2 times a term which
converges exponentially to zero.
Corollary 1. Let R > and z < EGi(R). Then there exist a > and 7 >
such that \P(G ! {R) < x x ) - P{G\R) < x2 )\ < e~ aI \x x - x 2 \ for every x x ,
x 2 < z, for every I > I , and for every R > R.
The main problem in the proof of Theorem 2 is that two-sided simple debt
contracts do not necessarily minimize the expected costs of monitoring the
monitor. 22 Theorem GHW shows that simple debt contracts are optimal for
22Consider the following example: To simplify computations we use a discrete distribu-
tion, but the example can be extended to a continuous distribution by simple approxima-
tion arguments. Assume that there are two entrepreneurs i = 1,2, and that the realization
of 9i is with probability 0.4; and 1 and 2 each with probability 0.3. Let (R,R') be a
simple debt contract with R = 1 and R* = 0.7 (recall that R' is the total payment by the
intermediary to the investors per firm). Let (j4(), R*) be an alternative contract such that
.4(0) = .4(1) = and A{2) = 2. The investor-intermediary part of the contract is the same
in both cases, and both contracts yield the same expected return to the entrepreneurs.
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the one-sided problem (any other contracts generate higher expected costs
for monitoring the entrepreneurs). In the two-sided case we minimize the
sum of the expected costs of monitoring the entrepreneurs and of monitoring
the intermediary. However, because the second summand need not be mini-
mal for two-sided simple debt, the main idea of the proof is to show that the
one-sided and two-sided problems are essentially the same for large interme-
diaries. By Corollary 1 changes in the intermediary-entrepreneur part of the
contract have a very small effect on investors' payoffs. Thus, minimizing the
expected costs of monitoring the entrepreneurs is the main concern.
4.1 Optimality of Two-sided Simple Debt Contracts
We now prove that two-sided simple debt is optimal.
Theorem 2. // there are sufficiently many entrepreneurs then the optimal
contracts are two-sided simple debt contracts. Two-sided simple debt con-
tracts strictly dominate all other types of contracts.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Assume without loss of generality
that there exists some alternative two-sided contract (^4/(-), AJ(-)), for every
/, which improves upon the optimal two-sided simple debt contract of The-
orem 1. By Theorem 1, we can restrict our analysis to two-sided contracts.
We show:
(i) The investor's part of contract ,4/(-) must be a simple debt contract, A}.
Next we choose a two-sided simple debt contract (Ri, R]) such that entre-
preneurs have the same expected return and the expected payments from the
intermediary to the investors remain constant. 23 Furthermore, from Lemma 3
However, the probability of default by the intermediary is lower with the second contract.
Specifically, it is 0.49 for the alternative contract and 0.64 for the simple debt contract.
23 First choose Rj such that EGl (R[) = EG r (Aj(-)). Because of the continuity results
of Lemma 1, a SDC, R}, can be chosen such that f R}(w) dF(R(-)) - f A){w)dF{A{)).
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in the Appendix, A} > R}.24 The contracts (Ri,R*j) must fulfill the condi-
tions of Corollary 1 for all sufficiently large / (i.e., there exists R > and
z < EGl{R) such that R] < z < EG^R) < Ri for all sufficiently large I). 25
We show:
(ii) Using (Rj,R}) instead of (.Aj(-),Aj), the left hand side of (3) decreases
by at most c*Ie~
aI \A[ — R[\. 26 The left hand side of (4) increases by at
least Icm\Ai — R[\, where m = minx€ [ ,r] /(x),
27 because with simple debt
contracts the intermediary must monitor entrepreneurs in fewer states of
nature. This is essentially the two-sided analog of Theorem GHW.
(iii) Since for large / the surplus is much greater than the loss, we can show
that it is possible to distribute some of the intermediary's gain to the
investors by increasing the face value of R\ such that both constraints are
satisfied and not binding. Hence, the face value of R[ can be lowered such
that both constraints still hold. The entrepreneurs are better off with a
contract with a lower face value. Consequently, the two-sided simple debt
contract (Ri, R}) dominates (Aj(-), A}), which provides the contradiction.
Therefore all optimal contracts must be simple debt contracts.
We now prove claim (i). This follows immediately from Theorem 1 be-
24This holds since by Lemma 3, / A*I (w)dF{R{-)) > J A}(w)dF(A(-)). Thus, to get
equality we must choose R} < A).
25By the (indirect) assumption of the proof, (Ai(),A}(-)) dominates the optimal two-
sided SDCs of Theorem 1. This is only possible if the probability that investors must mon-
itor the intermediary goes to zero as / gets large. Otherwise the expected monitoring costs
would go to infinity. Thus, in the limit investors receive the face value A) with certainty,
i.e., lim/_oo f A}(w) dF(A(-)) — lim/_ 00 j4J. Clearly, the costs of monitoring an individ-
ual entrepreneur fs cdF(w) remain bounded away from zero as / —<• oo. Dividing both
sides of (4) by / and taking the limit we conclude that lim/^oo A} < lim/^oo EG I (A()),
so there exist z,z' such that A) < z < z' < EG1 (A()) for all sufficiently large /. Since
R} < A'j by Lemma 3 (cf., previous footnote) and EGl {Ri{)) = £'G/ ( J4/()) by definition,
it follows that R} < z < z' < EG'iRii)). Now choose R such that z < R < fl/ for all
sufficiently large /. This is exactly the condition of Corollary 1.
* The two-sided SDC does not necessarily minimize the probability of default by the
intermediary. Thus the left hand side of (3) may be smaller under contract (Aj(-),A}).
27m > by assumption (A2).
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cause the intermediary is like an entrepreneur whose production is described
by the random variable G/ (-).
Next we prove claim (ii). In order to compute the change of the left hand
side of (3) we need only compute the change in expected monitoring costs
(because the first integral on the left-hand side of (3) does not change by
construction of (R, R*)). In the following, let Ai be the simple debt contract
with the same face value as Aj(-). Observe that:
/ c'jdFiR,)-! c}dF(A^))<f c}dF(R,)- [ c]dF(Aj). (8)
Js
*i
Js\- Js
'r
}
Js
'r;
This inequality follows from two factors: First, the income of the intermedi-
ary from contract A\ is higher than from contract Aj(-) in all states, hence
less monitoring occurs; and second A} > R*t .
Clearly, the difference in payoff from an individual entrepreneur to the
intermediary between the two SDCs with face values A\ and Rj is at most
A 7 - £/. 28 Therefore
Gl
(Ri) = \E G >(Ri) > )E[g^/)-(^-^)1 = G^Ay^-Rj). (9)
1 t=i * i=i
Hence (9) implies,
P{G\At) < R}} > P{G I {Ri) < R) - (Am - Ri)}. (10)
From (8), (10) and Corollary 1 it now follows that
/ Cl dF(Rj)- f cjdFiAiW^Cje^iAi-Ri). (11)
Js
r-
Js
'a
}
The intermediary's loss (i.e., the decrease of the left hand side of (4))
can be computed using the main idea of Theorem 1: If agents use contract
Ai(-) instead of Ri, the intermediary must monitor in additional states w £
7sAi — Ri > since both contracts have the same expected return but Rj is a SDC
(hence it has the lowest face value among all contracts with the same expected return).
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[R[,Aj]. Hence, expected monitoring costs increase by J^ 1 cdF > cm(A[ —
Ri), and the total loss is at least Icm\Ai — Rj\. This proves (ii).
Finally we prove (iii). Let e > 0. From footnote 19 we have R*j < z <
EG^R) < Rj. Hence, by the law of large numbers there exist h > and I
such that
P({G ! {Ri) > R) + h}) > 1 - e, for all I>I. (12)
(12) and Corollary 1 imply that by increasing the face value of R] by h < /*,
the payoff" to investors (i.e., the left hand side of (3)) increases by at least
-j~h{\ — e) — hc)e~ aI . If / is sufficiently large, this amount is bounded below
by j/i(l — 2c). Again because of (12) the intermediary's profit (i.e., the left
hand side of (4)) is decreased by at most Ih(l — e).
By choosing h = jY^c"I e~ aI{Ai — Ri) constraint (3) is fulfilled and not
binding (by the computations in the previous paragraph). Given this /i,
the profit of the intermediary decreases by at most 7y^f^cJe-a/ (/l/ — R[).
Comparing this to the total gain, which is Icm, it is clear that an / can be
chosen independently of Aj, such that the gain is greater than the loss. 29 This
means that constraint (4) is not binding as well, which proves the Theorem.
4.2 Monitoring With Two-sided Debt Contracts
Throughout the paper we have described simple debt contracts by their two-
sided payoffs (R,R*). However, simple debt contracts also implicitly charac-
terize two-sided monitoring intervals (S,S*). The key insight in understand-
ing optimal financial intermediation (i.e., delegated monitoring) in environ-
ments with non-trivial default risk is that both the intermediary-investor
and the intermediary-entrepreneur sides of the problem are interconnected.
That is, unlike in the limit case, the entrepreneurs' contract with the inter-
mediary affects investors' payoffs and monitoring costs. Thus, the cost, risk
29Clearly this is the case if jjz4j c
'i
e
al < cm which holds for all sufficiently large /
and is independent of A[ and Rj.
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reduction, and monitoring aspects of intermediation described by Tobin in
the Introduction (i.e., reasons (1), (2), and (3)) are all related. Theorem 2
shows that if there is sufficient diversification, then two-sided simple debt
contracts solve the monitoring problem (i.e., (3) in Tobin's explanation) be-
cause if sufficient risk reduction is achieved then aggregate monitoring costs
are minimized (i.e., reasons (1) and (2)). Thus, the "sufficient diversifica-
tion" in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 in essence describes the imperfect
asset transformation services provided by banks.
Our results in Sections 3 and 4 have two interesting features: First, our
Examples in Section 3.2 show that significant asset transformation can be
achieved by surprisingly small intermediaries. Second, Theorem 2 shows that
the monitoring problem is solved by private contractual arrangements among
agents. These results depend on the assumption that the probability distribu-
tions that describe firms' project returns are independent. This dependence
suggests that restrictions imposed on firms by regulators which constrain
their ability to contract with firms whose project returns are not correlated
severely undermine the efficacy of such private contractual arrangements.
Branching restrictions are a prime example of such restrictions, as returns
within a restricted geographical area are unlikely to be independent.30 Many
authors have argued that the reason the Canadian banking system has been
more stable than the US banking system is because Canadian banks were
able to branch freely while US banks were heavily restricted (e.g., see My-
ers (1931), (1970)). It is important to remember, however, that the pooling of
independent risks is only one (albeit important) aspect of the intermediation
problem. As our Examples show, the structure of the underlying portfolio
distribution, deposit and loan rates, monitoring costs, and portfolio size also
jointly determine the outcome.
30See Boyd and Smith (1990) for an environment with different locations and an explicit
analysis of the interlocational flow of funds. Their analysis is conducted in a model with
no aggregate default risk.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we show that delegated monitoring dominates direct investment
and that two-sided simple debt is optimal in a costly state verification model
with non-trivial default risk. Our economic environment requires us to in-
troduce new mathematical arguments based on the large deviation principle.
This mathematical technique is useful for three reasons: (i) it allows us to
compute the actual size of a sufficiently well diversified "small but finite"
intermediary; (ii) it is essential for establishing the optimality of delegated
monitoring when monitoring costs are unbounded; and (iii) it is essential for
establishing the optimality of two-sided debt (regardless of the monitoring
cost structure) because uniform convergence of the densities does not follow
from the law of large numbers.
Recently, costly state verification studies (cf., Townsend (1988) or Mook-
herjee and Png (1989)) have shown that the form of the optimal contract may
be altered under stochastic monitoring. In contrast, our delegated monitor-
ing result is not affected by stochastic monitoring. This follows from the fact
that as in the deterministic case, the probability that a state occurs in the
stochastic case which triggers monitoring goes to zero exponentially. Hence
the expected cost of monitoring the monitor goes to zero as well, and dele-
gated monitoring continues to dominate direct investment. Our rationale for
studying deterministic monitoring is similar to that given for the monitoring
cost example given in Section 2.2. We wish to establish gains from delegated
monitoring which stem from the intermediary's ability to eliminate duplica-
tive verification costs for a benchmark case. If other factors exist which
further reduce monitoring costs (e.g., stochastic monitoring), intermediation
will be even more attractive.
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6 Appendix
The following notation will be useful in the analysis that follows. Given some
two-sided contract, let Ti(-) denote the aggregate payoff of the J — 1 investors
from the intermediary who interacts with / entrepreneurs, and 71 denote the
expected payoff of a single investor from the intermediary. For the two-sided
SDC with delegated monitoring, (R(-), R),(R*(-), R*) these payoffs are:
rj(tR(.),J2),(ir(.),ir)) = f R^w)dFI(R(-),R)(w)
] (13)
Jo
ll((R(.),R),(R*(.),R*)) = J
L-{T
I(.)}-Js
C*dF I (-). (14)
The following Lemma establishes that the above payoff functions are con-
tinuous in the face values R and R* for SDCs. This proves continuity of
constraint (3). We also prove results which are necessary to get continuity of
constraint (4) and of the argument of the two-sided optimization problem.
Lemma 1. Let R{w) be one-sided simple debt with face value R. Then
the functions R t-> f R(w) dF(w) and R >—> Jw<RcdF(w) are continuous.
Furthermore, (R, R*) i— Tj(R,R*) is continuous; and (R,R*) i—> -)i(R,R*)
is continuous at every (R,R*) £ M2 , such that R* < R.
Proof. The proof for the first two functions is straightforward. We now
prove continuity of Tj. Note that,
P({G\R) > R*}) < P{{G\R + h) > R*}) < P{{G ! {R) > R* - &}), (15)
for h > because of (10). Therefore Jf{x)dF I(R-h h)(x) < f f(x +
h) dF(R)(x), for every increasing step-function /, and hence for every arbi-
trary increasing function / by a standard approximation argument. Further,
\\A(-) — R(-)\\
oo
< \A — R\, for all simple debt contracts A and R. Thus,
|r7(jj + h,R* + hm ) - T^R, BT)\ < \h\ + \h*\, (16)
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for every h, h* > and hence for every /i, h* € JR. This proves continuity of
IV It now remains to prove that (R, R*) h* fO^c* dF(R) is continuous at
every (R, R") 6 M such that H* < R. The distribution of G^R) has a density
which is bounded by a Kn £ JR in (—00,/?) (cf., Lemma 4). Therefore (15)
implies
| f*^ c* dF^R) - /^ c* dF7(£ + A)| < #„|fc|- Since this inequality
holds for every R* < R and since R" y-> /^ c* dF^R) is clearly continuous,
this proves continuity of 7/.
To prove optimality of two-sided simple debt we need an additional tech-
nical Lemma which shows that two-sided simple debt contracts maximize
total payments to investors (not including monitoring costs). The result is
formally stated in Lemma 3. It follows immediately from the next Lemma.
Lemma 2. Let ft be a probability measure on [0, M\. Let R(-) and A(-) be
two contracts with the same expected value. We assume that R(-) is a simple
debt contract R. Then the simple debt contract is less risky than A(-) in the
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz; i.e., f u(A(w)) dfi(w) < f u(R(w)) dp,(w),
for all concave functions u.
If we interpret u as a utility function, then Lemma 2 essentially says that
all risk averse consumers prefer simple debt contract to any other contract
with the same expected value. This is one of the criteria for comparing
the riskiness of two distribution of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). By using
Theorem 2 of their paper which proves the equivalence of three different
concepts, and by using their argument on p. 230 ff, the proof of the Lemma
is straightforward. We now give the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let Ha and Hr be the cumulative density functions
of the distributions of A(-) and /?(•), respectively. Let G(t) = HA (t) — HR {t),
and let T(y) = Jy G(x) dx. Then A(-) is more risky than R(-) if the following
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two conditions are fulfilled:
(17) T(M) = 0, and (18) T{y) > for every y € [0, M].
Let g be the density of G. Partial integration yields T{M) = f G(x)dx =
xG(x)\^
—f xg(x) dx = 0, since the integral over xg(x) is the expected value
of A{-) - R(-). This proves (17). Note that G{t) > for every < t < R,
and G{t) < for every R < t < M. This together with (17) proves (18).
Theorem 2 of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) implies that A(-) is more risky
than R{-). This proves the Lemma.
Lemma 3. Let (R,R*) be a two-sided simple debt contract and (A(-),R*)
be an alternative contract where EG I (A(-)) = EG\R). Then T[(R,R*) >
r7(A(.),^).
Proof. Note that
r/(#(-), #*(•)) = //•/ R*(jE RM) dF(wl)dF(w2 ) . . . dF(wi). (19)
Since R*(-) is a concave function we can apply Lemma 2 and inductively
substitute R(-) by A(-) in (19). This proves the Lemma.
Next we show that convergence in the law of large number is exponential.
This result is used in Section 3 to establish gains from delegated monitoring.
The proof follows immediately from the large deviation principle.
Lemma 4. Let (X,), e /v be a sequence of independent identically distributed
random variables with values in [0, M] and distribution fi. Let fin be the
distribution o/-^"
=1 .Y,. Then f.i n ([0, b}) converges to zero exponentially as
n —> oo for every b < EX{.
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Proof. M(£) = f e^x dp(x) < oo for every £ E iR, since p has a compact
support. Let T(x) = sup£
€/? (£x — logM(£)). Then Cramers theorem (Varad-
han (1984), Theorem 3.1) implies that J is a "rate function", and that pn
satisfies the large deviation principle with rate X. Hence,
l/nlog/zn ([0,6])<-I(6), (20)
for every b < EX. 31 It therefore remains to prove that 1(b) > for every
b < EX,:
For fixed b let H(£) = £6 - logAf(£). Since H(0) = 0, it is sufficient to
show that H'(0) ^ 0. This, however, can be easily verified:
fxeZ*f(x)dxH ^ = b ~ j e^f(x)dx
consequently H'(0) = b — EX{ ^ 0. This and (20) immediately imply that
Pn([0, b}) < e-
I(6)n
,
for every 6 < EXt . (21)
This proves the Lemma.
For the optimality of two-sided simple debt contracts proved in Section 4
we need a stronger result than Lemma 4. In particular, we must show that
the densities of pn also converge to zero exponentially on every interval [0, b]
where 6 < EXt .
Lemma 5. Let (X,),
€
7v be a sequence of independent, identically distributed
random variables with values in [0,A/] and distribution p.. We assume that
p = p + \8r where supp p C [0, R] and p has a density f with respect to the
Lebesgue measure on M. We assume that f is continuously differentiable on
[0, M]. Let pn be the distribution of - X^"=i %ii and ^ $R ^e the Dirac point
measure. Then p n = p n + An <5# where supp p n C [0, /?]. p n has a density
fn with respect to the Lebesgue measure which converges uniformly to zero as
n —* oo on all compact subsets of[Q,EX t ). This convergence is exponential.
31 This is the form of the rate function for intervals [0,6], where 6 < EX{ (see Varad-
han (1984, p. 8)).
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The idea of the proof of Lemma 5 is as follows. We first show that
the derivative of the density functions of G1 (R{-)) is bounded by a poly-
nomial term (24). This is straightforward if the densities are continuously
differentiable with compact support in M, see for example Floret (1981) Ex-
ercise 14.24. In our case the densities are discontinuous at and R which
requires us to deal with the derivatives at these two points separately. The
idea of the proof, however, is essentially the same. If the Lemma does not
hold then this immediately implies that the measure of an interval [0, 6] can
only converge to zero with polynomial speed (25). However, by Lemma 4 the
probability of every such interval with b < G ! (R(-)) converges to zero with
exponential speed as / —> oo (21). This contradiction proves Lemma 5.
Proof: We first derive an upper boundary for the derivative of fn . The main
problem is that / is discontinuous at and R as a function defined on JR.
Claim 1: Let it, v be functions on IR with support in [0,T]. Let u be
continuous from the right and bounded. Let v be continuously differentiable
in [0, T\. Then the convolution u * v is continuous from the right and \{u *
«)'L<HKL+2R>L.
Let z(t,x, h) = u(t)^[v(x + h — t) — v(x — t)]. Furthermore let Bi^ = {t: —h <
x - t < 0} and let B2
,
h = {t:T - h < t - x < T}. Then
/ z(t,x,h) dt = h z(x + th,x,h)dt = u(x + th)v(h — th)
Jb
x h Jo Jo
dt.
Consequently lim/^o Js . z(t,x,h)dt = u(x)v(0), since u and v are differen-
tiable from the right. A similar argument yields lim/^o/e z(t,x,h) dt =
u(x)v(T). Therefore
(u * v)'(x) = lim [ z(t,x,h)dt = I u{t)v'{x - t) dt + u{x)v(0) + u(x)v{T),Mo J J
which proves claim 1.
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Claim 2: The distribution of YJi=\X{ has a density gn on [0,nR). The
point {nR} has probability An . The right-hand derivative g'n (x) exists for
every n
€
IV and for every x
€ [0, nR). Further, there exists a constant
K < 2|// | oo + 4||/|^ such that \g'n (x)\ < n 2K for every n € IN and for every
x e [0,nR).
For the proof of claim 2 we proceed by induction. For n = 1 there is nothing
to prove. We now assume that the inequality holds for n — I. Using the
formula for the density of the sum of two independent random variables and
accounting for the "point mass" A at R and A 71-1 at (n — l)R we get
gn (x) = J
g
n- x (t)f(x -t)dt+ \ n
~ l
f(x -{n- l)R) + \gn- X {x - R), (22)
for every x 6 [0, n/2]. (22) implies
\\9n\L < \\9n-AMf\L + l/Ioc + b-il. < 2II/IL + 11^-ilL-
Consequently
b«L<2n|/L. (23)
Using (22), (23) and claim 1 yields
WnL < \9«-iUf'L + «»l/ll + A-'iyi. + %I.-iL-
By substituting the induction hypothesis for K = 2||/'||
oo +4|/| 2 , we conclude
the proof of claim 2.
Note that fn {x) = ngn (nx) is the density of /zn with respect to the
Lebesgue measure. We get
l/n(x )l < n*K, f°r every n e IN, and for every x G [0, R ). (24)
In the second part of the proof we proceed indirectly. Assume that there
exists a 6 < EX, such that fn does not converge uniformly to zero on [0, b]
with exponential speed. That means that there exist a sequence en that does
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not converge exponentially to zero and a sequence {yn )ne jv in [0, 6] such that
fn(Vn) > £ for every n £ IN. We prove that under these circumstances, (24)
implies that // n ([0,6]) cannot converge to zero exponentially which contra-
dicts Lemma 4.
Let
U ( \ - I
£ ~ n
*K (X ~ Vn)' if Vn < X < Vn + ^5
[ 0, otherwise.
Let b' E {b,EX{). Then there exists an integer n such that yn + -~qr < b'
for every n > h. Consequently < hn (x) < fn (x) for every n > n, because
of (24). Therefore
f
b '
f
b ' £ 2
A*n([0,6']) = / fn{x)dx> hn {x)dx = ——
—
. (25)
By (21) and (25) we get -^jjt < e~an for every rc > n, a contradiction. This
proves the Lemma.
We are now ready to prove Corollary 1 from Section 4.
Proof of Corollary 1. The distribution of 6 t has by assumption a density
/ which is continuously differentiable on [0, M\. The densities of F 1 (R) are
then given by /# = /|[o,£] + <$/?, so the constant K of (24) can be chosen
independently of R. Thus inequality (25) holds uniformly for every R. Fur-
ther, P{Gn {R) < x) < P{Gn (R) < x) for every x e M. Thus, (21) holds
uniformly for every distribution (.i n of Gn (R), where R > R, so Lemma 5 also
holds uniformly for every R > R. This proves the Corollary.
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